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Services PTAs: A factsheet
• Before the year 2000, only 6 of the 55 WTO-notified 
PTAs covered services 
• Since then, more than half of the 150+ PTAs have 
involved services
• 70 PTAs address both goods AND services; 6 are 
services-only PTAs
• 62% of services PTAs feature an OECD Member; 13% 
are N-N, 49% N-S and 38% are S-S – yet 74% of 
services trade is N-N (no EU-US PTA in services)
• Such trends broadly mirror specialization patterns in 
services trade
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Broad results from literature
• Even as the Vinerian approach to estimating the welfare 
effects has lesser analytical relevance…
• …there are lower costs of trade diversion from 
preferential access than in the case of goods trade
• However, the sequence of liberalization may matter 
more in services trade esp. in sectors with network 
externalities…
• …because location-specific sunk costs of production are 
important so that even temporary privileged access for 
an inferior supplier can translate into durable longer-term 
market advantage deterring future market contestability
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We know little about preferences and their possible 
erosion in services trade…but preference margins are 
real (if possibly theoretical)
• The scope for – and political economy of – preference erosion in 
services trade is understudied and hard to gauge 
– Do PTAs entrench regional preferences or facilitate WTO 
commitments? (This remains an important empirical question to 
which the end of the DDA will provide measurable answers)
– There is considerable “water” both in GATS commitments and 
the  latest DDA offers (This may be entirely tactical and linked to 
the DDA’s state of play on agriculture and NAMA )
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GATS vs PTAs: Modal Differences in Levels of 
Liberalization and Margins of Preference
GATS DDA Offer    PTAs     GATS/PTA     DDA/PTA      PREF. 
MARGIN
(0 to 100) % % %
_______________________________________________________________
Total score  27 34 63             38 54              46‐62
Mode 1 24 30 59             41 51 49‐59
Mode 3 30 38 67             45 57 43‐55
_______________________________________________________________
OECD
Mode 1 43 51 59 73 86 14‐27
Mode 3 53 59 67 79 88 12‐21
_______________________________________________________________
Non‐OECD
Mode 1 18 23 60 30 38 62‐70
Mode 3 23 32 67 34 48 52‐66
________________________________________________________________
Source : Author calculations based on Marchetti and Roy (2008).
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Comparing the level of services trade and 
investment liberalization across sectors
Sector GATS DDA PTA GATS/PTA  DDA/PTA   Pref. Margin
(0 to 100) % % %
__________________________________________________________________________________
Professional 30 39 67 44,8 58,2 41,8 – 55,2
Computer 55 74 93 59,1 79,6 20,4 – 40,9
Postal/Courier 14 20 53 26,4 37,7 62,3 – 73,6
Telecom 51 58 80 63,8 72,5 27,5 – 36,2
Audio‐visual 17 20 50 34,0 40,0 60,0 – 66,0
Construction 40 46 75 53,3 61,3 38,7 – 46,7
Distribution 32 41 76 42,1 53,9 46,1 – 57,9
Education 18 25 57 31,6 43,9 56,1 – 68,4
Environmental 20 30 62 32,3 43,4 56,6 – 67,7
Financial 36 40 53 67,9 75,5 24,5 – 32,1
Health 8 11 34 23,5 32,4 67,6 – 76,5
Tourism 51 61 83 61,4 73,5 26,5 – 38,6
Maritime 12 23 57 21,1 40,4 59,6 – 78,9
Rail 14 20 52 26,9 38,5 61,5 – 73,1
Road 16 18 56 28,6 32,1 67,9 ‐ 71,4
Auxiliary transport 21 24 58 36,2 41,4 58,6 – 63,8
Source: Author calculations based on Marchetti and Roy (2008)
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But what about rules of origin?
• The restrictiveness of rules of origin determines the extent to which non-
members can benefit from trade preferences negotiated in agreements
• Given that a majority (62%) of WTO-notified agreements involve a 
developed country member, the majority of PTAs covering services adopt 
the most liberal (i.e. substantial business operation) rule of origin, with a 
view to promoting third country FDI inflows into the integrating area and 
extending the benefits of integration to all investors that are established in 
one of the PTA Parties. In such instances, the preferential liberalization 
of Mode 3 largely approximates MFN liberalization
• South-South PTAs make increasing use of the space afforded them 
under Article V.3 to adopt more restrictive rules of origin aimed at limiting 
benefits to insiders
• Rules of origin targeting cross-border supply (Mode 1) remain largely 
unaddressed (and weakly enforceable), and rules dealing with Mode 4 trade 
tend to be highly restrictive, typically bestowing  temporary entry benefits 
only to citizens or permanent residents of PTA Parties
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So do preferences really matter? Are they 
more theoretical than real?
• Feasibility constraints in enforcement-poor regulatory settings –
many developing and most least developed countries do not have 
the regulatory means to enforce preferences
• Practicality of maintaining parallel regulatory regimes 
• Tepid advances on MRAs in most PTAs
• Preferences appear weakly enforceable for many Mode 1 
transactions and are of least relevance for Mode 2 trade
• Article V.6 all but multilateralizes preferential liberalization for Mode 
3 for N-N and N-S PTAs (accounting for the bulk of services trade)
• Preferences are most feasible where the border matters, such as for 
Mode 4 trade (but this concerns the smallest share of trade and of 
commitments, <5%)
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Moreover, some issues are thorny still 
for PTAs
• Sensitive sectors tend to be the same across negotiating 
settings despite the fact that in almost all instances, PTAs have 
generated forward movement (especially true of N-S PTAs and 
those involving the US)
• Progress on Mode 4 trade remains uneven and generally 
limited even in PTAs, though the possibility to contain MFN 
leakage helps to raise comfort levels at the trade-migration interface 
(also treated in non-trade deals, especially for lower-skilled 
movement)
• Sectors such as land transport/logistics, MRAs in professional 
services lend themselves more readily and easily to 
“neighbourhood” approaches
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Bottomline
• Even as the potential downslides of preferential services 
liberalization may be less ominous…
• …preferential access does result in significant first-
mover advantages, which can be used to deter entry for 
more efficient third-party suppliers
• Also, PTAs are here to stay…
• …even though one cannot deny that the gains from
multilateral liberalization are likely to be larger
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Multilateralizing services preferentialism
• Notifying MRAs to the WTO under Article VII of the 
GATS
• Making preferences in services trade time-bound
• Showcasing PTAs with liberal denial of benefits
provisions as best practice accords
• Negotiate voluntary best practice guidelines for services 
agreements
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Thank you!
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